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ABSTRACT:  As a small, open economy with a small export sector, Armenia has 
experienced a large amount of stress from the financial crisis.  The government 
exited a peg-like exchange rate regime after a drain of foreign reserves.  The loss of 
reserves was put to loss of revenues from mining exports, but can also be put to the 
effects of global financial crisis on remittance inflows.  Worldwide, the World Bank 
expects remittances to fall from US$305 billion in 2008 to $290 billion in 2009.  In 
this paper I explore the effect of global crisis on the loss of reserves supporting the 
monetary system.  Bank balance sheets expanded rapidly and, though small relative 
to GDP, accepted many assets tied to real estate.   Banks’ asset-liability mismatches 
have their root cause in changes to the flow of hard currency brought on by the 
crisis. 
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9 July 2009.  I thank Bryan Roberts, Armine Khachatryan, Ashot Mkrtchyan, Arman 
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After six consecutive years of double-digit GDP growth, the Armenian economy was 
caught in the downdraft of the global recession in 2008.  GDP grew at a more 
moderate 6.8% pace in 2008.   A significant contributor to growth had been the 
export of labor with the return of remittance income to Armenia.  Private transfers 
had grown in 2006 and 2007 but fell late in 2008, and were 32.5% below 2008 
levels in January-April 2009.  GDP fell 15.7% in the January-May 2009 period from 
year-earlier levels and the IMF now expects GDP to contract 9.5% in 2009.1  Around 
the world, remittances are down $15 billion, or about 5% from 2008 levels. 
 
In many developing countries the expectation is for growth to continue but at a 
much slower rate.  After growing 6.6% in 2007 and 5.8% in 2008, the IMF expects 
growth of 2.5% in 2009 and 3.8% in 2010 in the Middle East and central Asia. 2  But 
in Armenia things have been much worse.  On June 22, 2009 the IMF offered 
additional support to the Armenian economy.  Deputy Managing Director Murilo 
Portugal offered this assessment: 
 
Since the approval of the stand-by arrangement in March 2009, the external 
economic outlook has deteriorated significantly for Armenia. Falling private 
transfers and capital inflows have aggravated external imbalances and 
affected household incomes and investor confidence. Construction activity, the 
main driver of growth in previous years, has collapsed, and the economy is 
experiencing a deep contraction. 
 
The banking system began to show signs of wear as well.  While no bank has failed 
since the start of the recession and bank capitalization ratios are substantially 
higher than prudential standards, 7.8% of bank loans were in arrears in the first 
quarter of 2009, double its level from six months earlier.  While the national average 
is not greatly concerning, some observers believe non-performing loans on some 
                                                        
1 Nienke Oomes, IMF resident , quoted in Hasmik Mrktchyan, “Armenia GDP to 
contract 9.5% -- IMF” Reuters, June 24, 2009. 
2 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, April 2009. 
bank portfolios are approaching levels that threaten those banks’ capital base.  To 
raise capital, many banks are selling assets. 
 
After the Central Bank of Armenia (hereinafter CBA) used a significant portion of its 
reserves to maintain the peg of the Armenian dram against the U.S. dollar, the 
government relented and permitted a devaluation and float of the currency on 
March 2, 2009.  The float was supported with a new program from the International 
Monetary Fund that included a loan more than four times the size of what had been 
previously contemplated for Armenia.  The Fund’s own assessment of the situation 
had changed dramatically in three months, with estimates of exports, remittances 
and foreign direct investment slashed for 2009. 
 
There is temptation to place Armenia’s issues in the broader context of global 
financial crisis and refer to its difficulties as an example of contagion.  Usually 
contagion is a problem revolved around financial interconnections.  Many observers 
last year thought that, because the Armenian banking system has little exposure to 
the international financial markets, it would weather the United States’ financial 
meltdown last September rather well.  But Armenia is not isolated in all economic 
spheres.  In particular, its goods market and its labor market are open towards 
Russia, following historical connections created earlier in the 20th Century. 
 
Much of the trouble the Armenian economy, I argue, is an example of economic 
interdependence with the Russian economy.  A recent report from the World Bank 
finds that Russian GDP is expected to decline 7.9% in 2009 after growing 5.6% in 
2008.3  Unemployment has risen from 6.4% to 9.4% in the first quarter of 2009.  
The construction sector, which hires many seasonal Armenian workers, fell 21% in 
the same period.  (More than half of Armenian emigrant workers work in Russia.) 
 
I explore in this paper the connection between the loss of income from remittances, 
particularly from Russia, and the instability of the Armenian financial sector.  I will 
review Armenian banking in the next section.  Growth of the sector has been heavily 
managed by the Central Bank of Armenia, which has protected the sector from 
excesses but may have restricted the diversification to those areas chosen by CBA.  I 
will then review the international sector, studying the impact of the financial crisis 
on both the exports of goods and of labor from Armenia.  An appraisal of the impact 
of the loss of remittance income on the economy is estimated in a third section, 
using both research by Banaian and Roberts [2006, 2007] and by Mkrtchyan, Dabla-
Norris and Stepanyan [2009].  In the concluding section I offer a few thoughts on 
how reforms could help insulate the Armenian economy from swings in remittance 
income.   
 
 
                                                        
3 World Bank, Russian Economic Report 19, June 2009. 
Financial activities in Armenia 
 
Financial intermediation in Armenia has been a persistent source of concern for 
policymakers since the first banks were established.  The presence of a large 
foreign-based bank in HSBC Armenia has been a common topic for discussion, with 
foreign capital in the banking system rising above 50% in 2007, while the number of 
banks in the country consolidated from 74 in 1994 to 22 today.  HSBC continues to 
dominate the deposit business in banking, holding more than 50% of deposits in 
2006 and xx% today.  Dabla-Norris and Floerkemeier [2007, p. 10] testify to the 
nature of the market: 
 
Banks differ greatly in size, outreach effort, and customer base. Around half of 
all Armenian banks are very small with negligible market shares in deposits 
and loans, which contributes to the sector’s overall low banking productivity. A 
number of these banks concentrate their activities in trade financing, money 
transfers, and private banking, rather than in deposit-taking and loan-making. 
Other banks serve a large number of small-scale depositors and borrowers. 
While they may have comparatively large shares of the overall deposit and 
credit markets, the size of financial service per customer can be extremely 
small, with some banks having average loans and deposits as low as US$200 
per customer. 
 
This diversity makes it difficult to make sweeping statements about the state of the 
banking system but also exposes the possibility that some banks may be much more 
greatly harmed by the financial crisis than aggregate data would tell.   
 
Intermediation has always been low, with a credit to GDP ratio of 6% at the end of 
2003.  Through concerted bank policy of the government (assisted by western 
donor organizations), that level had risen to near 12% at the end of 2007.  Such 
rapid expansion of credit (over 30% per year in 2006 and 2007) would give at least 
some people pause to consider loan quality.  Nevertheless, because liquidity and 
capital levels were so high, concerns over bank lending practices were 
overshadowed by calls for greater intermediation. 
 
Dollarization has declined dramatically in the last two years, at least in terms of 
deposits.  (I have no information on the level of cash dollarization.)  Firms in 
Armenia have long shown a preference for holding demand deposits in local 
currency, but both firms and households preferred their time deposits in dollars.  
But as the Armenian dram appreciated through the middle part of the decade, more 
and more households were lured into the local currency even for their time 
deposits.  Lending to households accelerated in 2007, and most loans were 
denominated in dram.4  Charts 1 and 2 show this below. 
 
                                                        
4 The movement in firms is similar but less pronounced, omitted here to save space. 
 Charts 1 and 2.  Household Loans and Deposits, Armenia 2003-08 
Source:  Central Bank of Armenia (CBA) 
Table 1 shows the effect of the crisis on bank balance sheets.  Capital and liquidity 
were adequate to handle the initial crisis.  But demand for foreign currency shot up 
largely as a flight to safety.  Asset and deposit growth stalled in the fourth quarter, 
liquidity began to decline and banks started to seek additional support from foreign 
investors.  Demand deposits switched from dram to foreign exchange. 
Table 1. Consolidated Commercial Bank Balance Sheet, 2005-2008 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Cash 26984964 30570217 39091529 40968000 
Reserves 120411078 123608438 138938157 175138200 
Securities 65576558 93623489 112190196 74766600 
Loans to firms 104216049 114550929 192424384 278734000 
Loans to households 73789943 108972461 206255267 332837000 
Loan loss reserves -3413727 -4562064 -7701615 n/a 
Other assets 53109280 57754017 83261361 121756200 
Total assets 440674145 524517487 764459279 1024200000 
     
     
Demand deposits    
  Households 52577898 58826297 67943187 61503000 
  Firms 92537273 102147492 141869783 124583000 
Time Deposits    
  Households 67071720 84719541 130082101 173470000 
  Firms 49151646 53911522 58618738 89100500 
Govt deposits 16275264 18063406 19303041 6308000 
Other liabilities 68299588 86677690 175065605 333535500 
Capital 94760756 120171539 171576824 235700000 
Total Liab/NW 440674145 524517487 764459279 1024200000 
     
capital/assets 21.50% 22.91% 22.44% 23.01% 
liquidity indicator 33.45% 29.39% 23.29% 21.10% 
     
*-2008 data from different source, approximate for Q4.   
Source:  2005-2007 National Statistics Service, 2008 CBA 
Loans increasingly took on longer terms, as most of these household loans went to 
mortgages or automobiles.  Meanwhile deposits were still relatively short term, so 
that banks began to experience the possibility of intermediation spreads – banks 
began to borrow short and lend long.   
Source:  CBA. 
Reserves rose during the crisis, jumping in February 2009 to 35.8% of deposits from 
18.7% in November 2008.  At the same time demand for cash dram fell from 87% of 
deposits to 64% in the same interval.  The changes virtually offset each other in 
terms of the money multiplier, and CBA held the monetary base close to year-ago 
levels,  
 
Remittances as a form of contagion or interdependence? 
 
In an interconnected world recessions in one country can lead to difficulties in its 
trading partners.  Countries trade output goods and services, and inputs like labor 
and capital.  All of those items will be affected by changes in economic activity in one 
country. 
 
Orosco [2008] using survey data from CBA found that approximately one-third of 
Armenian households receive remittances from family members abroad.  On 
average this comes to $1600 per household.  77% of those surveyed reported that 
the money came from Russia (and another three percent from Ukraine; the largest 
non-CIS country that was a source of remittances was the United States.)  Most 
funds were used to support current expenditures rather than saved; very little was 
saved.  70% was applied to current consumption and about ten percent for 
education. 
 
Table 2.  Net Migration, Armenia 2002-07 
Year To CIS countries Outside CIS 
2002 8039 1173 
2003 6315 1306 
2004 6445 1268 
2005 6196 1612 
2006 5266 1452 
2007 5013 1436 
Source NSS, The Demographics Handbook of Armenia 2008  
 
Orosco estimates that the range of remittance income is between US$400 million 
and US$ 1 billion, or 3.4% to 8.4% of 2008 GDP.  Other estimates (Banaian and 
Roberts [2006, 2007]) put the number at more than double this, and Stratfor [2009] 
estimates remittances as “one-fifth” of GDP.  It is worth noting that some of the 
difference comes from the latter studies including migrant workers who return 
within a year; they are not included in the CBA/Orosco survey due to a difference in 
definitions.   
 
Data on remittances is of course notoriously difficult.  Some money comes via wire 
transfer through banks and money transfer organizations (MTOs) such as 
Unistream and Anelik.   The flow of remittances is quite seasonal, peaking in the 
third quarter.  To ease perception, I have seasonally adjusted the data (using moving 
averages).  The fall in remittances began earlier than the decline in currency ratios 
or pressure on the dram, in the fourth quarter of 2008.  The data only reflects the 
balances at commercial banks.  For MTOs, the transactions tend to be much smaller 
(average size AMD 281,000, or less than US$1000, as opposed to AMD 13.8 million 
remitted via commercial banks) but far more used, and they followed a similar 
pattern of stalling in the fourth quarter.   
 
As noted above, the Russian economy has slowed dramatically since December 
2008, and as a result its demand for labor from other countries has fallen.  The 
Russian government announced early in 2009 that it would reduce the number of 
work permits given to emigrants from countries of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States by half, from 4 million to 2 million.  Stratfor reported that 
approximately “250,000 workers are said to have left Russia, including Tajiks and 
many Georgians ejected after the war with Russia in August.”  Worldwide 
remittances were anticipated by the World Bank to fall 5-8%.  They note that the 
decline was likely to be pronounced since the Russian ruble has declined by 35% 
since August 2008.  Nevertheless, the World Bank expects some resilience in 
remittance income in part because those workers sent home may take accumulated 
savings with them.5 
 
The decline in exports of both goods and labor can be seen by noting that, between 
January and April of 2009, exports were 47.8% below their levels in the first four 
months of 2008 (from US$338.3 million to $175.6 million) while remittance net 
inflows fell from US$318.1 million to $207.6 million in the same time periods.  Of 
that, the decline from Russia alone is almost the entire amount, from US$277.8 
million to $173.6 million.  That loss of remittance income represents a substantial 
decline in the supply of foreign exchange, which may have helped pressure the 
exchange rate of the AMD.  The economic decline in Armenia reduced imports by 
25% to US$893.5 million, however. 
                                                        
5 Dilip Ratha and Sanket Mohapatra, “Revised Outlook for Remittance Flows 2009-
2011:  Remittances expected to fall by 5 to 8 percent in 2009.” World Bank, 
Migration and Development Brief 9, March 23, 2009. 
 
These losses represent a fundamental contagion that is the by-product of the 
linkages of a more globalized economy.  Liang, Willett and Zhang [2009, pp. 3-4] 
explain: 
 
There is no one generally accepted definition of contagion. All concepts have in 
common, however, the general idea of developments in one market or country 
affecting those in another. While contagion often carries the connotation of the 
irrational transmission of shocks from one country to another, a broader 
definition that is also frequently used applies to any transmission effect 
including those through trade flows where a recession in one country is 
transmitted to others through the real sector. Often labeled economic 
interdependence, such fundamentals based contagion is perfect consistent with 
fully efficient financial markets and may be considered the polar opposite of 
irrational contagion transmitted through market hysteria or other types of 
market inefficiency. 
 
Between these extremes are a host of possible types of at least partially rational 
transmission mechanisms operating through financial sectors. … This financial 
interdependence operates similarly to trade interdependence and gives rise to 
the prospect of countries being “innocent victims” of adversity in other 
countries. Generally, however, these forms of contagion are relatively mild 
unless a major trading partner or financial centers are involved. Thus, for 
example, while the Argentine crisis of 2001-2002 had detectable influences in 
markets in Asia, its major effects were on immediate neighbors. Russia’s crisis 
had much broader effects because these came largely through its effects on the 
major financial centers like New York… 
 
With a relatively small financial market, the Armenian economy was not prone to 
the financial contagion of the type that markets experienced in the Russian crisis.  
Much of the decline in capital inflows expected in Armenia (the IMF [2009] expects 
now for more than a billion U.S. dollars less capital flowing into the country due to 
FDI and other private capital flows) is a consequence of the trade decline rather 
than the result of financial contagion.  The IMF discusses whether local banks “could 
be vulnerable to liquidity problems, reflecting the fragile confidence of the public in 
the banking system due to previous episodes of devaluations and bank runs in 
Armenia.” (p.6) But the source of the bank disturbance comes from the decline in 
dram lending, as noted above.  By allowing depreciation, CBA gives the banks some 
breathing room to take declining remittances and convert them to dram. 
The Economic Effects of Remittance Drops 
 
The negative effect of the Russian economic decline on Armenia can be predicted in 
a number of ways.  Banaian and Roberts [2007] identify four macroeconomic effects 
of a decline in remittances: 
 
1. A direct effect from lost income to households (income effect), which may 
have Keynesian multiplier effects through consumption and investment; 
2. An indirect effect from decreasing imports of goods as a result of their 
status as luxury goods (import substitution effect); 
3. An indirect effect that decreases imports due to depreciation of the 
exchange rate as remittances are converted to drams (exchange rate 
effect); and 
4. An indirect effect in the long run from an increase in the effective labor 
supply because fewer workers depart to foreign labor markets (labor 
supply effect).  For the purposes of looking at the effect of a temporary 
shock like the Russian recession, I ignore this effect below. 
 
Using a model developed by USAID for the Armenian Ministry of Finance it was 
estimated that the direct income effect on output of an AMD 100,000 decrease in 
remittances was to decrease investment and consumption each by AMD 35,000 in 
the short run.  The long-run effect on consumption through the multiplier was 
expected to be a decrease of AMD 72,000.   
 
A decrease in imports on the other hand would lessen the impact of a decline in 
remittances on Armenian production.  If households facing lower income due to 
fewer remittances responded by substituting lower-costing domestic goods for 
imports, output would not be as adversely affected.  Banaian and Roberts identify 
that decrease in imports from an AMD 100,000 decline in remittances as equaling 
69,000.  The exchange rate effect is much smaller in that model, perhaps no more 
than AMD 18,000 in their model.  All together, the impact of an AMD 100,000 
decline in remittances was found to decrease GDP by AMD 20,000 in the long run.   
 
Since it appears that remittances decreased by about US$39 million in the first four 
months of 2009 versus 2008, that makes for a $7.8 million or about 3.5% decline in 
GDP due to remittances.  I would argue that, since that number uses only 
remittances through the commercial banking system, this estimate is low but not by 
too much.  Though more remittances come through MTOs, their volume is likely to 
be much lower.  Compared to official GDP decrease of 9.7% for January-April, 
remittances would explain not more than half of the decline. 
 
For the remainder, we can turn to evidence of declining capital flows for foreign 
direct investment and other private capital flows.  The IMF [2009] estimates that, 
besides remittances and exports, another US$589 million decline in FDI and private 
capital flows over the full year, or about 4.9% of 2008 GDP.  This will certainly 
account for some of the additional decline.  Most of this is attributable as well to the 
Russian output shock, since much of FDI and private capital flows are from Russian 
sources.  If the drop in trade were to add 1% more to the decline in GDP (which is 
perhaps a conservative estimate), it would be reasonable to assert that the Russian 
shock causes most of the observed decline in output, rather than some financial 
contagion. 
 
Mkrtchyan, Dabla-Norris and Stepanyan [2009] provide a more complete model for 
analysis of this issue.  Using a small open economy model intended to illustrate the 
impact of various monetary policy rules (in the context of CBA’s commitment to 
inflation targeting), they argue regarding a remittance shock and to a shock to 
foreign output.  The distinction they draw between these two impacts is important.  
Consumption spending should fall due to a fall in remittances if that fall is 
exogenous, but it would be offset by an appreciation in the exchange rate.  Overall, 
the impact on consumption would be mixed.  In the case of a negative foreign output 
shock, however, the impact on consumption is unambiguously negative.  A foreign 
output shock hits domestic output and consumption faster both through lower 
exports and because the home family of an emigrant sending remittances shares in 
the loss of the income in the host country.  The shock is more temporary if it comes 
from foreign output.  The implication for the Armenian economy would be a sharp 
but relatively short recession, self-reversing when Russian output recovers. 
 
Mkrtchyan, et al., note that the period of dedollarization between the middle of 2006 
and end of 2007 was a period where expectations of the exchange rate moved 
contrary to their model predictions:   
 
“The sustained appreciation created expectations of a continuing currency 
appreciation, and a resulting decline in the risk premium. This is also confirmed 
by actual data which show a rapid growth in demand for the domestic currency 
at the expense of the foreign currency.”  (p. 30)   
 
If there was a moment of irrationality in the Armenian economy it was presented in 
this belief that appreciation would continue.  There is little doubt that such 
overconfidence played some role in the redollarization of late-2008, and that this is 
contributing to the tightening of credit for dram-denominated loans.   
 
Concluding thoughts 
 
There is a danger in using a general story of contagion, broadly used to describe the 
experience of the western economies in the last two years, to describe what is 
happening in Armenia.  Liang and Willett [2008, pp. 218-19] identify a difference 
between contagion and interdependence as applied to global crisis.  Contagion is 
more common during crisis but for the most part is limited to a “few days or weeks.”   
 
Medium-term responses from the currency and financial markets tend to be 
much more differentiated, although the determinants of these more focused 
medium-term responses can be quite complex, including both trade and 
financial linkages and a broad range of fundamentals including financial and 
political as well as economic considerations.  Since information is often quite 
imperfect, perception of the fundamentals can shift without any change in the 
actual fundamentals themselves.  Thus a crisis in one country can act as a 
wake-up call that generates re-evaluations of conditions in other countries. 
The difference between contagion and interdependence is important for policy-
makers.  Contagion is a problem for which there are some solutions (though these 
are limited, as recent events have shown), but interdependence begets its own 
solution: market interdependence is wealth-creating, encouraging division of labor 
and specialization.   
 
Nonetheless, some policy implications of the current crisis can be drawn: 
 I feel that banking policy has been by and large sound, with some 
reservations on mortgage lending marked below.  Because of low leverage 
ratios in the Armenian banking system, the amount of credit destruction that 
has to occur as capital is destroyed by loan losses will be less than in the 
West.  (A bank with 10% capitalization rate has to reduce credit by $10 for 
each dollar of bank capital destroyed; for a bank with 25% capitalization, 
only $4 of credit is lost.)  There is a good deal of variety in banks, however, 
that is masked by using system amounts.  Smaller banks tend to be less 
profitable, and mergers may be prudent at this time.   
 The mortgage market has been the subject of much work by the CBA, the 
government, and donor organizations.  Projects have tried to develop a 
secondary mortgage market, and some have proposed mortgage-backed 
securities.  It has been quite a successful project thus far, with mortgages the 
fastest growing asset on bank balance sheets.  But this growth put more 
dram-denominated assets onto banks, without any necessary increase in the 
amount of dram deposits.  If banks borrow in foreign currency and lend in 
dram, they face substantial exchange rate risk.  These considerations may 
have put some additional strain on banks in the current recession.  
Policymakers may wish to reconsider whether putting this additional 
exchange rate risk onto the banks can and should be mitigated. 
 Exchange rate policy changed this past March, with CBA choosing to return to 
a flexible exchange rate regime.  While this may make much sense in terms of 
inflation control, it may increase the amount of exchange rate risk faced by 
banks that borrow in dollars and lend in drams (whether encouraged by 
banking policy or not.)  Good control of inflation will be the best policy for 
banks but, as we have seen in the last year, not all bank troubles begin with 
inflation. 
 Remittances, as we have seen, are a part of Armenia’s globalization policy.  
The preponderance of emigration of labor to Russia and other CIS 
destinations implies that Armenia’s exposure to Russian shocks will continue 
to be the predominant source of external economic instability.  But they 
should not be seen as contributing to contagion and regulation of remittance 
flows should continue to be light.  Encouraging diversification of neighbors to 
whom Armenian labor might emigrate would be somewhat helpful, but the 
size and historical significance of the Russian economy is likely to favor it as 
the Armenian destination for years to come. One could also consider how 
Armenia manages its emigrant workers.  Some countries have a more active 
program for placement, for providing information to potential émigrés, and 
for managing the return flow of workers and their remittances. The 
Philippines provides but one example.   
 Trade, which all at this conference have said should stay open, should be seen 
as trade both in outputs – goods and services – and in inputs – labor and 
capital.  As noted above, Russia’s decision to reverse the flow of work permits 
to CIS migrant workers serves as protectionism of a different sort.   Beyond 
that, it is worth noting that Armenia’s trade patterns are still the product not 
only of history but current impediments.  The border to Turkey remains 
closed; trade with Iran creates issues with western allies; Georgia’s political 
uncertainties create problems as well.  It would be worthwhile for 
policymakers to think more about whether putting so many eggs in the 
Russian basket is wise, and if not, what could be done to diversify trading 
partners.  
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